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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
KAREN MAAS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 981654-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The defendant, Karen Maas, appeals from a judgment of conviction for Falsely 
Signing Evidence of Financial Card Transaction, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-506.1(4) (Supp. 1997), Unlawful Use of Financial Transaction Card, a 
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-506.2(1) (1995), and Property 
Obtained by Unlawful Financial Transaction Card Conduct, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-506.4 (1995). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
The following issue is presented to the Court for review, together with the respective 
standard of appellate review: 
Issue on Appeal. Did defendant waive her claim that the prosecutor improperly used 
her response to the investigating officer's question as to whether or not she wished to talk to 
him? 
Standard of Review. Where "'a party through counsel has made a conscious decision 
to refrain from objecting or has [otherwise] led the trial court into error, [the court] will then 
decline to save that party from error/" even under the "plain error" doctrine. State v. 
Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 635 (Utah App. 1997) (quoting State v. Baker, 791 P.2d 155, 158 
(Utah 1989)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES 
The interpretation of the following constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are 
determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal: 
U.S. Const, amend. V: 
No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of l a w ; . . . . 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1: 
. . . . No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Defendant was charged by Information with (1) Falsely Signing Evidence of Financial 
Card Transaction, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-506.1(4) 
(Supp. 1997), (2) Unlawful Use of Financial Transaction Card, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-506.2(1) (1995), and (3) Property Obtained by Unlawful 
Financial Transaction Card Conduct, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§76-6-506.4(1995). R. 1-3. Following a one-day jury trial, defendant was convicted on all 
three counts as charged. R. 101-103. Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 
zero-to-five years in the Utah State Prison on the felony count and to two concurrent six-
month jail terms on the misdemeanor charges. R. 111. The trial court stayed the sentences 
and placed defendant on probation for 36 months, the terms of which included a 30-day 
commitment in the Grand County Jail. R. 111. Defendant timely appealed. R. 117-119. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
One afternoon in December 1997, Robert Prickett went to the Alco Discount Store in 
Moab to do some Christmas shopping. T. 14. After spending about 15 minutes in the store, 
he purchased light bulbs, sensor lights, garbage bags, and Christmas lights totaling $11.48. 
T. 24. Mr. Prickett made the purchase with his credit card at register 3 where defendant was 
working. T. 25, 28-29, 78. Rather than swiping the credit card through the magnetic slot, 
defendant entered Mr. Prickett's credit card number manually at or near 3:26 p.m. T. 22,81. 
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After making the purchase, defendant returned the credit card to Mr. Prickett and he left the 
store. T. 15-16. 
Approximately one-half hour later, another charge was made on Mr. Prickett's credit 
card at register 3. T. 21,23. The charge was for a camping set totaling $211.49. T. 21,23. 
The signature of Mr. Prickett on the credit card slip was not his signature. T. 17. Mr. 
Prickett did not purchase the camping set, nor did he authorize anyone to use his credit card. 
T. 15,79. Three and one-half weeks later, defendant pawned the camping set purchased with 
Mr. Prickett's credit card, together with some jewelry and a television set. T. 37-38, 74-75. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Defendant's sole claim on appeal is that her right to a fair trial was denied as a result 
of testimony of, and reference in rebuttal to, defendant's response to the investigating 
officer's question as to whether or not she wished to talk to him about the case. Defendant's 
reply to Deputy Neal's question was in two parts: First, she responded, "Why, you have 
everything anyway." Immediately thereafter, she responded, "No, I don't want to talk to 
you." However, defendant waived any challenge on appeal because she declined the court's 
offer to give a curative instruction and failed to object to the prosecutor's remarks in rebuttal. 
In any event, the first statement was not an invocation of her right to remain silent, 
and therefore, eliciting testimony of the same does not undermine her right. Testimony of 
the second statement, which was an invocation of her Fifth Amendment right, was not used 
to undermine her right to remain silent but was only a circumstance surrounding the deputy's 
investigation. Finally, reference in rebuttal to defendant's reply was used not to infer guilt 
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from her silence, but rather to point out a prior incriminating statement of defendant implying 
that the police had everything by way of evidence against her anyway. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims on appeal that she was denied a fair trial because her post-Miranda 
silence was used against her. Aplt. Brf. at 1. Specifically, defendant contends that the 
prosecutor improperly elicited at trial her refusal to talk to Deputy Neal and then improperly 
used that refusal during rebuttal. However, as discussed below, defendant waived any 
challenge to the use of the statement, and, in any event, the State did not use defendant's 
post-Miranda silence against her. 
I. RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND. 
Police Contact with Defendant. During the course of Deputy Neal's investigation, he 
went to defendant's home to speak with her. T. 47. Deputy Neal testified that he identified 
himself and explained that he was investigating the misuse of a credit card. T. 48. Deputy 
Neal explained to defendant all the evidence he had gathered to that point. He then advised 
her of her rights and read her a waiver of those rights.1 When Deputy Neal asked defendant 
if she wished to talk to him, she responded, "Why, you have everything anyway? "No, I 
don't want to talk to you." T. 48. Thereafter, Deputy Neal did not question defendant but 
left the residence. Id. 
1
 Although Deputy Neal does not expressly state that he advised defendant of her 
rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966), it appears likely 
that the rights to which he referred were in fact the Miranda rights. Accordingly, the 
State will treat defendant's subsequent statements to Deputy Neal as post-Miranda 
statements. 
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Proceedings at Trial. At trial, defense counsel objected on Fifth Amendment grounds 
to any questioning regarding Deputy Nears attempts to interview defendant. T. 47-48. After 
the State rested its case, the trial court revisited defendant's objection and concluded that 
while the first statement, "Why, you have everything anyway," was admissible, the second 
statement, "No, I don't want to talk to you," should not have been admitted. T. 50. 
The trial court offered to give a curative instruction to the jury, but defense counsel 
declined. T. 50. Instead, on direct examination, defendant explained her refusal to speak to 
Deputy Neal indicating that she "didn't feel there was anything [she] could say at the 
moment." T. 77. She further explained that in light of the documents he had gathered, "the 
way it added up, [she] just didn't think that [she] should say anything at the moment, that 
[she] should seek counsel or do something." T. 77. 
The State did not cross-examine defendant regarding her decision to remain silent nor 
did the State refer again to defendant's second statement invoking her right to remain silent. 
During the State's rebuttal, the prosecutor did allude to the first statement, incorrectly 
quoting defendant as having said, "No, you have everything anyway." T. 111. However, 
defendant did not object when the prosecutor misquoted her statement. 
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II. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
A. Defendant Waived Her Claim that the Prosecutor Improperly Used Her 
Statements to Deputy Neal. 
Relying on the factors articulated in Morrison and Reyes,1 defendant argues that the 
court's failure to give a curative instruction supports her claim that she was prejudiced by the 
testimony referencing the exercise of her right to remain silent and the prosecutor's alleged 
comment thereon. Aplt. Brf. at 21. Although the trial court initially denied defendant's 
objection to the testimony, it subsequently offered to instruct the jury to disregard testimony 
about defendant's second statement. T. 50. Defense counsel declined the court's offer, 
noting that although he didn't want to waive the argument, he u[didn't] want to point it out 
to the jury again either" because "it would just bring more harm" if he did so. T. 50. 
Defendant's claim now on appeal seeking reversal for the trial court's failure to give a 
curative instruction is tantamount to invited error. It is well settled that "a party cannot take 
advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing 
the error." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993). The invited error doctrine 
preserves the "long-established policy that the trial court should have the first opportunity 
to address the claim of error." Id. 
Having failed to allow the trial court to correct its own mistake, defendant waived her 
right to challenge it on appeal and cannot now claim error where the court offered to mitigate 
2As discussed below, the decisions in these cases were largely abrogated under 
Harmon. 
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any damage through a curative instruction.3 Where "'a party through counsel has made a 
conscious decision to refrain from objecting or has [otherwise] led the trial court into error, 
[the appellate court] will then decline to save that party from error/" even under the "plain 
error" doctrine. Winward, 941 P.2d at 635 (quoting Baker, 791 P.2d at 158)).4 A similar 
claim was addressed in Harmon. In that case, as in this case, the trial court offered to give 
a curative instruction regarding the elicitation of testimony about the defendant's silence. 
Harmon, 956 P.2d at 269. Harmon's defense counsel also declined the instruction because 
he did not want to draw the jury's attention to the statement. Id. The Supreme Court held 
that "[b]ecause no curative instruction was given, [it had] no basis for review, and [the court] 
decline[d] to speculate as to the effect an instruction may or may not have had on the jury/' 
Id. Likewise, because defendant declined, for strategic reasons, the court's offer of a curative 
instruction, this Court has no basis for review. 
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor's comments in rebuttal constituted a Doyle 
violation. However, just as defendant waived her right to challenge the testimony on appeal 
because she declined the court's offer to give a curative instruction, she also waived her right 
to challenge any improper reference by the prosecutor in rebuttal because she failed to object 
3The trial court incorrectly indicated that counsel was not giving up any objection 
he made beforehand. T. 50. 
Notwithstanding defendant's decision not to draw the jury's attention to her 
silence through a curative instruction, she nevertheless later explained her silence on 
direct, testifying that she "didn't feel there was anything [she] could say at the moment. 
Seeing that these pieces of information, the way it added up, [she] just didn't think that 
[she] should say anything at the moment, that [she] should seek counsel or do 
something." T. 77. 
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and seek a curative instruction. In Winward, the prosecutor pointed out to the jury that the 
defendant did not put his attorney on the stand, apparently to testify as to why the defendant 
sought counsel before talking with the investigator. 941 P.2d at 632, 634. This Court 
"decline[d] to address the propriety of the prosecutor's closing argument because appellant 
made a conscious tactical decision not to object and obtain a curative instruction at trial, thus 
waiving the right to review." Id. at 634-35. This Court refused to consider the issue under 
the plain error doctrine because defendant had made a conscious decision to refrain from 
objecting "that would have allowed the trial court 'to mitigate any damage done by the 
prosecutor's comments.'" Id. at 635 (quoting State v. Hales, 652 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 
1982)). 
Defendant's counsel was clearly cognizant of the potential harm engendered from an 
improper use of defendant's silence. He had already objected to any testimony about Deputy 
Neal's attempt to interview defendant. T. 47. Then, when the trial court offered to give a 
curative instruction once it heard the testimony, defense counsel made the tactical decision 
to decline the trial court's offer of a curative instruction, reasoning that it would do more 
harm than good. T. 50. Accordingly, it is fair to say that counsel's failure to object to the 
prosecutor's vague, at best, reference to defendant's silence was a tactical decision to not 
draw the jury's attention to her silence. As such, defendant is foreclosed from challenging 
the remark on appeal. 
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B. Even If Defendant Had Preserved Her Claim on Appeal, the Prosecutor's 
Use of Her Response Did Not Undermine Her Right To Remain Silent 
Assuming arguendo that defendant had preserved her claim on appeal, the prosecutor 
did not improperly use her response to Deputy Neal, and, therefore, she was not denied a fair 
trial. The warnings mandated by Miranda "require that a person taken into custody be 
advised immediately that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says may be used 
against him, and that he has a right to retained or appointed counsel before submitting to 
interrogation." Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 2244 (1976). If a suspect 
knowingly and intelligently waives those rights, police may proceed with interrogation. State 
v. Archuletta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1238-39 (Utah 1993). If, however, a suspect chooses to 
exercise those rights, the police may not question the accused "unless [he] 'initiates further 
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. '"Id. at 1239 (quoting Edwards 
v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1884-85 (1981)). The Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments assure that "when a person invokes his constitutional rights, the 
prosecution should not comment thereon, nor so use it in any way that will tend to impair or 
destroy that privilege." State v. Urias, 609 P.2d 1326, 1328 (Utah 1980). 
The lodestar decision regarding the use of a defendant's post-Miranda silence at trial 
is Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240 (1976). The issue in Doyle was "whether a 
state prosecutor may seek to impeach a defendant's exculpatory story, told for the first time 
at trial, by cross-examining the defendant about his failure to have told the story after 
receiving Miranda warnings." Id. at 611, 96 S.Ct. at 2241. As in Doyle, the defendant in 
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this case declined to speak with the investigating officer, but then offered an exculpatory 
explanation at trial. Unlike Doyle, the prosecutor in this case did not cross examine 
defendant in any manner regarding her decision not to talk to the investigator. Nevertheless, 
the analysis in Doyle has been applied to any improper use of a defendant's post-Miranda 
silence, whether through direct examination of a government witness, cross-examination of 
the defendant, or reference in closing. 
In Doyle, the defendant claimed that he had been framed by a third party. Id. at 613, 
96 S.Ct. at 2242. On cross-examination, and in an effort to undermine the defendant's claim 
that he was framed, the prosecutor repeatedly questioned the defendant as to why he had not 
told the investigating officer about the alleged frame-up when he was arrested. Id. at 613-14, 
96 S.Ct. at 2242-43. The Court concluded that the questioning was improper, holding that 
"it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested 
person's silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial." Id. at 
618, 96 S.Ct. at 2245. Thus, "Doyle rests on 'the fundamental unfairness of implicitly 
assuring a suspect that his silence will not be used against him and then using his silence to 
impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial'" Greer v. Miller, 474 U.S. 284, 291, 
106 S.Ct. 634, 638 (1987) (quoting South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 565, 103 S.Ct. 
916,923(1983)). 
Since Doyle, several Utah Supreme Court cases have discussed in some depth the use 
of a defendant's post-Miranda silence at trial. The most recent of these decisions is State v. 
Harmon, 956 P.2d 262 (Utah 1998). In that case, the Utah Supreme Court expressly held 
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that "the mere mention that a defendant invoked his constitutional rights does not primafacie 
establish a due process violation." Id. at 268. The Harmon court observed: 
"Doyle and the cases applying the rule against using a defendant's post- arrest 
silence against him center the constitutional inquiry' around the particular use 
to which the post-arrest silence is being put. In other words, we must look at 
the circumstances in which a criminal defendant's post-arrest silence or 
request for counsel is revealed in court in order to determine whether the 
purposes underlying the rule in Doyle have been undermined. 
Id. (quoting Lindgren v. Lane, 925 F.2d 198, 202 (7th Cir. 1991) (emphasis in original). 
Although defendant acknowledges the holding in Harmon, see Aplt. Brf. at 8, she 
gives short shrift to the principles articulated by that court, relying instead on a series of 
decisions in this Court that applied a different and far higher standard of Doyle error. For 
example, defendant relies on this Court's statement in State v. Byrd, 937 P.2d 532,535 (Utah 
App. 1997), that "'virtually any description of defendant's silence following arrest and 
Miranda warning will constitute a Doyle violation.'" Aplt. Brf. at 12. This statement is in 
direct conflict with the later Harmon decision. Moreover, the statement, which was quoted 
from a federal court of appeals case, was actually taken from Justice Brennan's dissent in 
Greer, where he argued for a much stricter standard than that adopted by the majority. See 
Greer, 483 U.S. at 770, 107 S.Ct. at 3111 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
The decisions in State v. Reyes, 861 P.2d 1055,1057 (Utah App. 1993), and State v. 
Morrison, 937 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah App. 1997), upon which defendant also relies, 
essentially created a standard of obvious error for merely eliciting testimony of a defendant's 
post-Miranda silence. As Harmon makes clear, however, such is not the rule under Doyle. 
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The mere mention of a defendant's post-Miranda silence is not a per se Doyle violation. 
"[T]he State must, in some way, use the defendant's silence to undermine the exercise of 
those rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment before it can be said that such rights 
have been violated." Harmon, 956 P.2d at 268. If it is established that the State improperly 
used the defendant's silence against her, a new trial will only be required "[i]f the error is 
substantial and prejudicial to the extent that there is a reasonable probability that it affected 
the reliability of the trial outcome." Id. 
Therefore, the threshold inquiry is whether or not defendant's response was an 
invocation of her right to remain silent. If so, the Court must determine whether or not 
reference to the invocation was used to undermine defendant's right to remain silent. If not, 
the inquiry stops. If so, the court must then determine whether defendant was prejudiced 
thereby. Defendant's response consisted of two separate statements. Defendant first 
responded, "Why, you have everything anyway." T. 48. This statement was immediately 
followed by the second statement, "No, I don't want to talk to you." Id. Due to the nature 
of these statements, they will be analyzed separately. 
1. Defendant's First Statement Was Not an Invocation of Her Right to 
Remain Silent. 
A fair reading of defendant's first statement leads to the conclusion that it was not an 
invocation of her right to remain silent, and therefore, testimony of the statement does not 
offend the principles articulated in Doyle and Harmon. The statement was an admission or 
declaration volunteered by defendant in response to Deputy Neal's attempt to determine 
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whether or not she wished to waive her rights. Defendant's response was similar to that of 
the defendant in United States v. Johnson, 56 F.3d 947 (8th Cir. 1995). In that case, as in this 
one, the investigating officer advised the defendant of his rights and then asked whether the 
defendant wished to waive those rights. Id. at 955. The court described the ensuing 
exchange between the defendant and investigating officer as follows: 
When Agent Vera read the waiver portion of the form to determine if Johnson 
wished to waive his rights, Johnson gave no direct answer but stated indirectly 
through use of profanity that he did not think he could help himself by talking. 
Agent Vera again attempted to determine if he wished to waive his rights, and 
Johnson asked, "if I tell you anything, you're just going to use it against me 
later, aren't you?" Agent Vera responded affirmatively. Johnson then refused 
to sign any forms but agreed to talk and stated, "you guys have all the evidence 
against me. I donft need to make any statement. I don't need to say anything." 
Faced with mixed signals, Agent Vera did not question Johnson about the 
crime but explained, "you have this opportunity to talk to me without a lawyer, 
to make a statement. You're the only person who can tell me about activities 
on January 28th of 1993." Johnson then responded in more certain terms, "I 
know I'm going to jail for a long time, the rest of my life, I can't help myself 
by talking to you." Johnson said nothing further, and questioning ceased. 
Id. (citations to trial transcript omitted). The circuit court concluded that the statements were 
not a clear invocation of the defendant's right to remain silent. Id. As a result, the court 
upheld the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress the statements. Id. 
The facts in this case present a much simpler scenario. Defendant's reply was made 
in two parts and in response to only one question posed by Deputy Neal as to whether or not 
defendant wished to talk to him. The first statement, like those made by the defendant in 
Johnson, cannot fairly be construed as an assertion of defendant's Miranda rights. Rather, 
the statement was more in the form of a rhetorical question from which the jury could infer 
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that defendant was conceding that it would not do her any good to speak with Deputy Neal 
because he already had the evidence against her. Accordingly, use of the first statement by 
the State to impeach defendant's explanation at trial is not prohibited by Doyle or Harmon. 
2. Testimony of Defendant's Second Statement Was Not Used to 
Undermine Her Right to Remain Silent. 
The State concedes that defendant's second statement, "No, I don't want to talk to 
you," was an unequivocal invocation of her right to remain silent. For this reason, Deputy 
Neal did not question defendant regarding the unauthorized credit card sale. As explained 
above, testimony regarding a defendant's invocation of her right to remain silent "may 
violate [] defendant's right against self incrimination" if improperly used by the prosecutor. 
State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 1187, 1205 (Utah 1984) (emphasis added). The United States 
Supreme Court in Greer observed that "[w]hen a defendant contends that a prosecutor's 
question rendered his trial fundamentally unfair, it is important 'as an initial matter to place 
th[e] remar[k] in context.'" Greer, 483 U.S. at 765-66, 107 S.Ct. at 3109 (alteration in 
original) (quoting Darden v. Wainwright, All U.S. 168, 179, 106 S.Ct. 2464,2471 (1986)). 
Upon doing so in this case, it becomes clear that the prosecutor did not elicit the testimony 
regarding defendant's silence to make any improper inferences. 
At trial, defense counsel unsuccessfully objected on Fifth Amendment grounds to any 
questioning regarding Deputy Neal's attempts to interview defendant. T. 47-48. The trial 
court overruled the objection and allowed the State to elicit the testimony. T. 47-48. 
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Relevant portions of the bench conference, and the ensuing direct examination of Deputy 
Neal, are reproduced below: 
BENCH CONFERENCE 
Defense Counsel Fm going to make an objection to any questions about 
whether or not he attempted to interview Ms. Maas. Ms. 
Maas refused to talk to him, and I think that would be an 
improper comment in exercising her Fifth Amendment 
right now at this time. She didn't exercise her Fifth 
Amendment right, but she did refuse to talk to Deputy— 
Prosecutor Well, the comment she made before refusing to comment 
is, I think, relevant, the way she— 
The Court What did she say? 
Prosecutor She said, Well, you have everything out, I don't have 
anything else to say. 
The Court I think I'll let that in. 
Defense Counsel We're on the record. My objection went on the record? 
The Court Yes, I think so. 
[DIRECT EXAMINATION OF DEPUTY NEAL CONTINUEDl 
Prosecutor After speaking to Mr. Prickett, did you contact Ms. Maas? 
Deputy Neal Yes, I did. 
Prosecutor Where? 
Deputy Neal At her residence on Williams Way. 
Prosecutor What was the nature of your conversation with Ms. Maas? 
Deputy Neal I met with [defendant], I identified myself. I explained the 
reason I was there was I was investigating misuse of a 
credit card. At that time I explained to Ms. Maas all the 
evidence I had acquired up to that time. At that time, I 
advised [defendant] of her rights, read her a waiver, asked 
her if she wanted to talk to me. She responded, "Why, you 
have everything anyway? No, I don't want to talk to you. 
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Prosecutor After she said that did you question her any further? 
Deputy Neal No, I left. 
Prosecutor That's all I have. 
Defense Counsel No cross. 
T 47-48. 
The reason the prosecutor elicited her response is clear. He did not seek to exploit 
defendant's silence as invoked in the second part of her response, but rather he sought to 
draw the jury's attention to defendant's incriminating statement that Deputy Neal had all the 
evidence against her anyway. Accordingly, to the defense's argument that evidence of her 
response would be an improper comment on the exercise of her right to remain silent, the 
prosecutor replied that "the comment she made before refusing to comment [was] . . . 
relevant." T. 47 (emphasis added). He did not argue that the second part of the response 
could be used to draw any negative inference on defendant. 
The response, although in two parts, was a single response to one question posed by 
Deputy Neal. As such, Deputy Neal's testimony regarding the second part of defendant's 
response was simply a circumstance surrounding his contact with defendant. As the Utah 
Supreme Court has recently observed, 
Doyle prohibits the prosecutor's use of defendant's silence to demonstrate 
guilt. However, we have held that, when an officer testifies to the 
circumstances surrounding an arrest, a part of which is defendant's silence, 
without further reference to or comment on the matter either in testimony or 
argument to the jury, there is no violation of that principle. 
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State v. Bakalov, 369 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, — (Utah 1999). See also Urias, 609 P.2d at 1328 
(finding that testimony of the defendant's invocation of his right to remain silent, which was 
but part of the circumstances of the arrest, was not used to cast an inference of guilt). No 
other reference or comment was made by the prosecutor to this second statement. It is true 
that the jury was exposed again to the second part of defendant's reply when it asked to view 
the video tape of Deputy Neal's testimony. However, this was not elicited by the prosecutor 
and did not constitute different or additional testimony regarding silence. The second part 
of the response consisted of merely 8 words in approximately 6 pages of testimony. The jury 
also asked to view the video tape of the testimony of Robert Prickett. T. 114. Moreover, 
"defendant testified at trial, 'thereby offsetting or even dispelling any negative inference 
regarding [his] silence.'" State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 806 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting 
Za/W>>>,699P.2datl206). 
3. Reference in Rebuttal to the First Statement Did Not Constitute a 
Doyle Violation. 
Contrary to defendant's claim, the prosecutor's comments in rebuttal were directed 
not at defendant's silence, but rather at her implausible explanation at trial in contrast to her 
concession to Deputy Neal when he asked her if she would talk to him. Admittedly, the 
prosecutor did not accurately quote defendant's reply, indicating that she said, "No, you have 
everything anyway," T. 111, rather than "Why, you have everything anyway." T. 48. Again, 
however, the remark by the prosecutor must be placed in context of the impetus of his 
rebuttal and preceding argument. See Greer, 483 U.S. at 765-66, 107 S.Ct. at 3109. 
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Defendant testified that an average-looking man, about six feet tall, who appeared to 
be in his forties, purchased the camping set about 30 minutes after Mr. Prickett. T. 68, 79. 
She testified that he returned to the store three or four days later seeking a cash refund in 
order to pay a fishing ticket. T. 69, 80. Defendant indicated that after explaining that cash 
refunds could not be given on credit card purchases, she suggested that he either sell the 
camping set or pawn it. T. 71. Defendant then testified that because she had an interest in 
the camping set herself, she made arrangements to purchase the set from him at her home the 
following evening. T. 71-72. She then claimed that she pawned the camping set, together 
with a television set and some jewelry, about three and one-half weeks later to pay a fine for 
driving on a suspended license. T. 73-75. 
In closing, defense counsel argued that defendant's explanation of events casted 
reasonable doubt on the State's case, requiring the jury to return a verdict of not guilty. T. 
98-109. In rebuttal, the prosecutor argued: 
. . . . How did Karen get the camping equipment out of Alco, I don't 
know. Maybe she took it out to her car at the end of her shift, maybe she had 
a friend take it out for her. For that matter, maybe she had a friend who was 
a six-foot tall average looking 40ish guy that a couple of nights later brought 
it over to her house, her trailer. I don't know. 
Mr. Schultz asked you that somehow after Mr. Prickett bought his 
Christmas lights he went outside and threw his receipt away and somebody 
found his receipt and that's how 30 minutes later this average looking six-foot 
guy came in and bought that camping equipment. But remember, Karen said 
the person came in with the card. Not just the numbers, with the card. 
Mr. Schultz asks you, what would a crook or criminal whose going 
around defrauding people buy using their credit cards? What would they buy? 
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A big ticket item that's easily convertible to cash. Exactly. That's exactly 
what she did and, lo and behold, she converted it to cash. 
* * * 
In order for you to believe the defendant's story you have to disregard 
that there was just a 30-minute gap between Mr. Prickett's legitimate purchase 
and this fraudulent purchase that the defendant did using his card number 
which she would have had. You have to disregard the fact that Mr. Prickett 
got his card back and didn't authorize anybody else to use his card. You have 
to disregard that the defendant was the only person who could have taken 
Exhibit No. 1, the legitimate card, the receipt signed by Mr. Prickett, and also 
would have had access to Exhibit No. 2, which is the forged receipt. You 
would have to disregard that when Kim Neal went to the defendant's house, 
showed her the evidence, asked if she had anything to say about it she said, 
"No, you have everything anyway." 
In order for you to believe her you would have to disregard all of that and 
you would have to buy the story that not only did this six-foot tall-I've 
forgotten it I've said it so many times-six foot tall average looking 40ish guy 
came in and made this fraudulent purchase with a card that Mr. Prickett still 
had on his person, but that same guy came back three days later and sold the 
same thing back to her and that she took it down and pawned it. 
Mr. Schultz said to you, I don't know what credit card fraudulent 
purchasers look like. Well, I don't either. But I want you to go into the jury 
room and deliberate and I want you to come back out and say that we don't 
know what fraudulent credit card purchasers look like either, but in this case 
they look like the defendant, and Karen Maas you can't lie your way out of 
this, we find you guilty. Thank you. 
T. at 109-12. 
The prosecutor was not, as defendant now suggests, asking the jury to infer 
defendant's guilt from her silence. The prosecutor's argument was rather directed at the 
incredulous story offered by defendant at trial. The prosecutor contrasted that story not with 
reference to her refusal to speak with Deputy Neal, but rather with her concession that he 
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"already [had] everything anyway." T. 48. Undermining a defendant's testimony with a 
prior inconsistent statement does not violate Doyle. See Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 
408, 100 S.Ct. 2180, 2182 (1980).5 
Any reference to defendant's silence by misquoting her statement was inadvertent and 
indirect at best. As held by the Utah Supreme Court, "[f]or a statement by a prosecutor to 
be constitutional error his remark must be 'manifestly intended o r . . . of such character that 
a jury would naturally and necessarily construe it to amount to a comment on the failure of 
the accused to testify.'" State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313, 315 (Utah 1985) (quoting State v. 
Nomeland, 581 P.2d 1010, 1011 (Utah 1978)) (other citations omitted). See also State v. 
Bartley, 784 P.2d 1231, 1237-38 (Utah App. 1989). When the prosecutor's remark on 
defendant's first statement is viewed in the context of not only his rebuttal, but also his 
closing argument,6 it cannot be said, as defendant contends, Aplt. Brf. at 19-20, that the jury 
5In Anderson, the Supreme Court observed: "Doyle does not apply to cross-
examination that merely inquires into prior inconsistent statements. Such questioning 
makes no unfair use of silence because a defendant who voluntarily speaks after receiving 
Miranda warnings has not been induced to remain silent. As to the subject matter of his 
statements, the defendant has not remained silent at all." Anderson, 447 U.S. at 408, 100 
S.Ct. at 2182. 
6After explaining the evidence introduced by the State, the prosecutor attacked 
defendant's theory of the case: 
"Now, having this evidence against the defendant, the defendant has to come up 
with what I am calling fancy, she has to use her imagination. And not only does she 
come up with a story of why Mr. Prickett's card had gone through her register twice in 30 
minutes, and she comes up with a story that somebody bought that, it's the only one she 
ever sold, that somebody, it's this average looking 40ish guy that's six feet tall that 
doesn't live here, but had been around three or four days because he had to pay a fishing 
ticket, he came through and he's the one and he charged it on a credit card and bought 
that. He picked it up later because it was too heavy for him to lift. 
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would "naturally and necessarily" construe it to be a comment on the defendant's failure to 
testify. Id. Instead the prosecutor's remarks merely pointed to defendant's prior statement 
that the police had everything already which was inconsistent with her explanation at trial. 
Accordingly, no Doyle violation occurred. 
C* Any Error, If Any, Was Harmless, 
Because the State did not use defendant's silence to undermine her rights under the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Court need not determine whether or not defendant 
was prejudiced. See Harmon, 956 P.2d at 268. Even so, any error, if any, was insubstantial 
and did not prejudice defendant "to the extent that there is a reasonable probability that it 
affected the reliability of the trial outcome." Id. Defendant claims that because the evidence 
was circumstantial, it was not overwhelming. Aplt. Brf. at 21-22. This assertion is simply 
not true. Circumstantial evidence can be as persuasive as direct evidence. See State v. 
Now, maybe that might possibly hold water except for the fact that Mr. Prickett 
said he got his card back after he charged his Christmas lights so that couldn't have. 
There wasn't any 40ish six-foot man that came through and bought that. He couldn't 
have because Mr. Prickett had his card back and Mr. Prickett didn't buy that. 
But not only does she use her imagination and come up with that bunch of the 
story, but two weeks later she's caught with the merchandise, the very thing that was 
charged by this mysterious man. So not only did this mysterious man come through her 
cash register, have Mr. Prickett's card, which he couldn't have had because Mr. Prickett 
had it, forged Mr. Prickett's name, but, Gosh, he sold me the camping equipment because 
he wanted to trade it back in and get cash. 
Is that reasonable? That's your decision. That's what this whole day out of all of 
our lives boils down to is reasonableness. If you believe that's reasonable, well, you 




James, 819 P.2d 781, 800 (Utah 1991) (Howe, J., concurring and dissenting). Although the 
State's evidence was circumstantial, it was compelling. 
It was established that defendant was working cash register 3 on the day in question 
and that no one else worked that register. T. 25, 28-29. Defendant conceded that she was 
working the register that day. T. 78. Mr. Prickett purchased various items at the register 
with his credit card. lckett got the credit card back. T. 24. Once Mr. Prickett had 
made the purchase through his credit card, defendant had access to his credit card number 
and consequently had the ability to make charges to his credit card by entering the card 
number manually and signing his name. T. 33-34. Approximately 30 minutes later, a 
camping set was charged to Mr. Prickett's credit card. T. 21, 23. Mi Prickett did not 
purchase the camping set. He did not authorize anyone else to use his credit card. Moreover, 
the signature on the credit card slip pertaining to the camping set was forged. See T. 15, 17, 
78. Three and one-half weeks later, defendant pawned the camping set for $360.00. T. 37-
38, 74-75. 
Faced with overwhelming evidence of guilt, defendant explained that (1) she 
purchased the camping set from an unknown man who had purchased the set using Mr. 
Prickett's credit card after the man tried to return the set three to four days later for a cash 
refund, and (2) she then pawned it for $360 to pay a fine for driving on a suspended driver's 
license. T. 68-75, 79-80. Defendant's explanation, in the light of overwhelming evidence, 
is "'transparently frivolous'" and implausible. Fields v. Leapley, 30 F.3d 986, 991 (8th Cir. 
1994) (citations omitted). Moreover, it was inconsistent with her statement that Deputy Neal 
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had ^everything anyway" as it pertained to the evidence. T. 48. Although her boyfriend 
confirmed defendant's claim that she had obtained the camping set as a Christmas present 
for him, he could not confirm her story as to how she came into possession of the set. T. 63. 
Indeed, her boyfriend testified that she never told him that she bought it from the man. T. 
63. Nor was her testimony otherwise corroborated by the man who purchased the set or 
anyone else. See Velarde v. Shulsen, 757 F.2d 1093,1095-96 (10th Cir. 1985). As such, any 
error, if any, was insubstantial and did not prejudice defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons and given the facts set forth above, the Court should affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
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